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Freight railway enterprises in both Europe and North America are in the process of 
significant restructuring, with EC policy changes dictating new ownership, organization, 
and cooperation arrangements in Europe and a series of major mergers having already led 
to highly concentrated regional markets in the U.S. and Canada.  Mergers, alliances, and 
organizational changes may raise important and complex issues regarding the level of 
competition facing goods shippers, with differing implications depending on the differing 
institutional contexts.  This paper examines the competitive consequences of these 
developments in Europe and North America and suggests some lessons for other network 
industries. 
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  Railway mergers and alliances have the potential to significantly affect 
competition under many circumstances.  On the one hand, mergers and alliances that 
increase efficiency, for example through more effective interlining, have allowed rail 
carriers to better compete with motor carriers for high valued freight cargos.  On the other 
hand, as in other industries, mergers and alliances with actual or potential competitors 
have the potential to reduce competition and raise prices, with adverse results for shippers 
and final consumers as well as in broader areas such as road congestion, air pollution, 
fuel consumption, and global warming.  In the rail sector in particular, the nature and 
magnitude of the effects, along with the lessons for other network industries, depend 
crucially on the setting in which they take place – especially on the model of rail sector 
structure and competition chosen by a country’s policymakers.   We may focus in 
particular on two separate models:  competition among vertically integrated train and 
infrastructure enterprises, and competition among independent train operating companies 
over a monopoly infrastructure.  We will focus mostly on freight rather than passenger 
operations, since the latter are typically subsidized and thus tend to raise different policy 
issues. 
  Competition among vertically integrated train and infrastructure enterprises is the 
rail sector model chosen by policymakers in the geographically large, freight-dominated 
countries of the Americas – originally by the United States and Canada, more recently by 
Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina as well.  At the risk of oversimplification, we may 
further break down this “American model” into a “North American model” – the US and 
Canada, with an emphasis on origin-destination competition between “parallel” vertically 
integrated railways – and a “Latin American model” – Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and 
Argentina, with an emphasis on competition for the business of shippers and customers at 
particular points served by more than one railway (Pittman, 2004a and 2007b). 
  Competition among independent train operating companies over a monopoly 
infrastructure is the model chosen by Brussels for adoption by the members of the 
European Union.  Again at the risk of oversimplification, we may further break down this 
“above-the-rail competition model” into a complete “vertical separation” model – the 
prohibition of the network operator from operating its own trains, a policy urged by EU’s Competition Directorate – and a “third party access model”, with a vertically integrated 
infrastructure and train company forced to allow access to its infrastructure to competing, 
non-integrated train operating companies.
1 
These models tend to blur a bit, as intermediate solutions such as “accounting 
separation” are accepted as means of preserving ownership integration while making 
third party access terms more transparent, and thus (it is hoped) preventing 
discrimination.  The degree to which complete separation of train and infrastructure 
operations in Europe has actually taken place – as well as the degree to which actual 
competition among train operating companies has appeared – varies a good deal by 
country.
2  “Third party access” tends to be what we observe in countries that have 
nominally chosen the vertical separation model but have moved only part way toward 
achieving it – i.e., countries that have taken steps to open up the train sector to 
competition but have not, or not yet, fully separated the incumbent freight operator from 
its infrastructure operations.
3  Germany may be the most salient example of this – it has 
instituted “accounting separation” but not yet “ownership separation” of train and track – 
but Russia is another – though in Russia the competing train operating companies are 
mostly theoretical only.
4 
The role and impact of mergers and alliances have varied and will vary among 
these different settings.  In North America, the competing parallel vertically integrated 
freight rail enterprises have merged up to the point that further mergers seem more likely 
to be of the end-to-end variety – and even these appear problematic from the regulator’s 
standpoint.  On the other hand, end-to-end alliances and cooperation, of various degrees 
of formality, seem to be flourishing, as the railways attempt to squeeze maximum 
production from highly utilized infrastructure.  In Western Europe there are fears of 
dominance or even monopoly above the rail as a single, state-owned company continues 
to make acquisitions, with some likelihood of competitive problems spilling over into 
Central and Eastern Europe as well; however, to the degree that vertical separation in 
                                                 
1 More broadly, vertical separation has become something of a reformers’ “default option” for 
infrastructure sector reforms around the world; see, e.g., Newbery (1999) and Pittman (2007a). 
2 See, e.g., Gómez-Ibáñez and de Rus (2006), part 1; Molnar (2006); and Pittman, et al. (2007). 
3 This is consistent with a broader point of Newbery (1999):  “Liberalizing entry into a … utility which 
remains both vertically integrated and state owned is the least disruptive reform….” 
4 ECMT (2004); Friebel, et al. (2007); Pittman, et al. (2007). 
  2particular countries is incomplete, there is a countervailing fear that vertically integrated 
incumbents will be successful at entrenching their monopoly positions.  In general, North 
American freight carriers seem focused on alliances at this point, while European carriers 
remain more focused on finding merger partners. 
Let us consider these different settings in more detail. 
2.  The Americas:  Competition among Vertically Integrated Railways 
Recent decades have seen a massive consolidation of the North American railway 
system.  Canadian railway shipping has remained divided between two transcontinental 
carriers, the Canadian National (CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP) railways.  On the US 
side, the number of Class I railways has declined over the past 30 years from 41 to five:  
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and Union Pacific Southern Pacific (UPSP) in 
the west, CSX and Norfolk Southern (NS) in the east, and the Kansas City Southern 
(KCS) in the center.  Both horizontal (“parallel”) and vertical (“end-to-end”) mergers 
were part of this consolidation.  Most recently and significantly, the number of major 
competitors was reduced from four to two in the west, with BN combining with ATSF in 
1995 and UP combining with SP in 1996, and from three to two in the east, with CSX 
and NS carving up the assets of Conrail in 1998. 
This process of consolidation came to at least a temporary end at the turn of the 
21
st century.  Faced with the first proposal to form a transcontinental railroad in the US – 
the proposed end-to-end merger of BNSF with CN – the Surface Transportation Board 
(STB) first imposed a moratorium on Class I rail mergers (in 2000) and then issued a new 
merger policy statement (in 2001) that significantly increased the burden of proof on 
merger applicants to demonstrate that a merger would be procompetitive rather than 
anticompetitive.
5  No mergers of Class I railroads have been proposed in the meantime.  
From a competition standpoint this set of developments is rather remarkable, since it has 
traditionally been parallel mergers that have raised the most serious competitive 
concerns, and yet the STB has approved a number of those, while the BNSF/CN 
                                                 
5 “Because of the small number of remaining Class I railroads, the fact that rail mergers are no longer 
needed to address significant excess capacity in the rail industry, and the transitional service problems that 
have accompanied recent rail mergers, we believe that future merger applicants should bear a heavier 
burden to show that a major rail combination is consistent with the public interest.”  STB, Docket 
EP_582_1, Major Rail Consolidation Procedures, Decision, June 11, 2001, at 9.  Kwoka and White (2004) 
describe these events in greater detail. 
  3combination, which the STB discouraged, would have been mostly end-to-end, a class of 
merger likely to have a much smaller effect on competition as a general matter.
6 
The academic literature generally suggests that broad railway deregulation in the 
U.S. – the 4R Act of 1976 and the Staggers Act of 1980 – had strongly positive effects on 
productivity in the industry, and that mergers had some additional positive effects as 
well, at least through the mid-1990s.
7  However, the long-term impacts of the most recent 
wave of large horizontal mergers are not so clear: the UP/SP combination resulted in 
dramatic and expensive service problems for shippers in some areas of the country; the 
trade press reports similar if less dramatic difficulties following the NS and CSX 
absorption of Conrail;
8 and the overall positive trend in customer surplus for freight rail 
shippers found by Ivaldi and McCullough (2005) reaches a peak and turns downward 
after 1998.
9  A related literature suggests that the Class I railroads are large enough that 
they have exhausted available economies of system size and are at or near the point of 
exhausting economies of density.
10  The evidence is also strong that, for those 
commodities that cannot economically be shipped by motor carrier or other modes, the 
presence of competing, vertically integrated railway companies has led to lower prices 
for shippers.
11 
                                                 
6 See, for example, the decision of the Surface Transportation Board regarding the division of Conrail 
between CSX and NS:  “With very minor exceptions, the combination … will be end-to-end and not 
parallel.  It has been our experience that end-to-end restructurings of this kind rarely result in a diminution 
of competition.”  STB, Finance Docket 33388_0, CSX Corporation, Norfolk Southern Corporation – 
Control, Conrail Inc., Decision, July 23, 1998, at 50. 
7 Berndt, et al. (1993); Wilson and Bitzen (2003); Ivaldi and McCullough (2005).  Chapin and Schmidt 
(1999) are less positive regarding the effects of mergers. 
8 According to an official from a shippers’ trade association, “There has been such havoc following all 
these mergers, with absolutely billions of dollars in lost shipments and other costs incurred by shippers.”  
Brian Milligan, “Rates keep going up, shippers weather ‘merger fatigue’,” Purchasing Magazine, May 4, 
2000.  See also Rip Watson, “Chemical group slams NS, CSX,” Journal of Commerce, July 9, 1999, and 
John Gallagher, “Unmoved by Merger,” Traffic World, November 8, 1999. 
9 On UP/SP, see especially Kwoka and White (1999).  Karikari, et al. (2002) and Breen (2004) attempt to 
show positive results from the UP/SP merger, but their arguments are not convincing.  See, e.g., the 
discussion before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/051205_Regulated_Industries_Transcript_refo
rm.pdf, at 58-61. 
10 The literature on the cost structure of US freight railways is extensive.  See, e.g., Wilson (1997), Bitzan 
(1999 and 2000), Schmidt (2001), Ivaldi and McCullough (2001 and 2008), Bitzan and Keeler (2007), and 
Christensen Associates (2008). 
11 For parallel competition, see Grimm (1985) Winston et al. (1990) Burton (1993) and Schmidt (2001).  
For competition among railways serving common points – “source competition” – see MacDonald (1987, 
1989a, 1989b) and Majure (1996). 
  4Even before the STB moved to its more skeptical stance on mergers – and 
increasingly since then – U.S. freight railroads have been moving to an increased reliance 
on alliances in order to improve efficiency, provide better service to shippers, and try to 
steal traffic from motor carriers (and from each other).  Beginning with a typology of 
strategic alliances suggested by Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and applied to the North 
American freight rail sector by Natarajan, et al. (2005), we may divide modern North 
American freight rail alliances into four categories:
12 
•  Make-or-Buy alliances that involve close cooperation by a single railroad 
company with an input supplier; 
•  Technological alliances that involve multiple railroad companies in technological 
cooperation with input suppliers and/or joint industry groups; 
•  End-to-End alliances that focus on joint marketing (and sometimes operations and 
investments) by end-to-end interchange partners – though we might also apply 
this label to alliances with trucking companies; and 
•  Parallel alliances that pair railroads that compete with each other as parallel 
carriers. 
The first three categories appear to be the real growth areas, which is probably just as 
well given the obvious potential for anticompetitive outcomes from the fourth. 
  In the first category, Natarajan, et al. (2005) include (1) a long-term contract in 
which CSX employees work under the management of GE Transportation Services for 
the maintenance and management of CSX’s fleet of GE locomotives and (2) CP’s 
contract with Alstom Canada to operate CP’s Ogden Shops in Calgary.  This type of 
alliance is one standard outcome in the continuum of the make-or-buy decision, i.e. 
whether to rely on the market for an input or to produce it within the firm.
13  Long-term 
contracts such as these between suppliers and customers of an intermediate product 
typically do not raise serious competitive concerns unless both parties possess market 
power in their respective markets and the contract is a de facto or de jure exclusive one:  
if those conditions are met, such contracts may have the effect of denying business to 
competitors (at either or both levels) and so foreclosing competition.  Given the small 
                                                 
12 We replace the category labels applied by Natarajan, et al. (2005) with our own. 
13 The classic sources include Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). 
  5number of Class I railroads serving most regions today and the concentrated nature of 
many rail supply markets,
14 the first part of the condition may well be met.  However, it 
appears that most of these contracts impose no exclusivity on either side; if that is the 
case, they seem unlikely to foreclose competition. 
  In the second category, Natarajan, et al. (2005) include (1) the “Friction Force” 
alliance led by Portec Rail that focuses on improving the efficiency of the all-important 
wheel-rail interface and (2) the cooperative arrangement among the nation’s freight 
railroads, Amtrak, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Illinois Department of 
Transportation, and the Association of American Railroads that is seeking to establish 
interoperability standards regarding positive train control technologies and systems.   
Alliances such as these that place many competitors in the same room should be able to 
avoid garden-variety collusion so long as they follow the advice of counsel (in the same 
way that meetings of trade associations do); standard-setting organizations, like trade 
associations, are ubiquitous in modern market economies.  However, the process of 
standard setting does have the potential to raise complex competition issues, and partners 
in a standard-setting organization or alliance must take note that U.S. courts “have found 
antitrust liability in circumstances involving the manipulation of the standard-setting 
process or the improper use of the resulting standard to gain competitive advantage over 
rivals.”
15 
The third category, alliances among end-to-end interchange partners, covers a 
wide continuum of cooperation.  At one end are the marketing alliances that exist among 
an increasing number of such partners, designed to solicit more traffic and improve the 
shipper’s level of satisfaction with the interline move.  (According to some reports, one 
recent innovation has been the delegation by one partner to the other of price quotation 
for the entire haul.)
16  Requiring much deeper coordination are operating alliances, in 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the Competitive Impact Statement in U.S. v. Amsted Industries, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f222700/222730.htm, and U.S. v. Ivaco, 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D.Mich. 
1989). 
15 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights:  Promoting Innovation and Competition (Washington, DC, April 2007), ch. 2.  See also 
Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head (486 U.S. 492 [1988]); American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
v. Hydrolevel (456 U.S. 556 [1982]); and Abbott, et al. (2006).  A recent appeals court decision in a high 
profile standard-setting case is Rambus Inc. v. FTC, No. 07-1086 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 22, 2008). 
16 See, e.g., John Gallagher, “Riding a hurricane:  building on success of market alliances, Florida East 
Coast Railway looks to expand I-95 corridor partnerships,” Traffic World, April 7, 2003, and John Boyd, 
  6which trains originating on one railway run “preblocked” – that is, without using 
switching yards or even changing locomotives – deep into the system of the terminating 
carrier, sometimes all the way to the final destination.
17  And then there are alliances that 
proceed all the way to joint infrastructure investments in order to improve interchange 
efficiency, most notably (1) the “Meridian Speedway” project, in which NS invested in 
improvements in KCS trackage in order to improve its ability to ship to the west coast via 
either UPSP or BNSF,
18 and (2) the “Patriot Corridor” project, in which Pan Am 
Railways and NS have applied to the STB for permission to form a joint venture, Pan Am 
Southern, to which Pan Am would contribute a 155-mile main line track and NS would 
contribute $140 million in cash and property to upgrade the line and improve rail service 
between Albany and Boston.
19 
To the degree that these end-to-end interchange alliances among Class I carriers were 
crafted as exclusive agreements, they could raise competition issues (and the broader 
“public interest” concerns of the regulator).  On the other hand, interchange arrangements 
themselves are generally efficient and procompetitive.  For example, it has been the lack 
of interchange agreements – as well as of private trackage rights agreements – among the 
three vertically integrated carriers created by the Mexican railways reforms that has been 
one of the disappointments of that experience (OECD, 2006). 
 Alliances that include joint infrastructure investments may be especially interesting 
from a competition standpoint.  Such investments are on their face output enhancing and 
clearly designed to enable speedier and more efficient rail movements to compete freight 
away from motor carriers and from other railways.
20  For those commodities for which 
                                                                                                                                                 
“NS Takes Bold, Short Steps:  Innovative plans with regional and short lines could boost rail freight 
volumes in Northeast,” Traffic World, June 2, 2008. 
17 Fred Frailey, “Who’s got the vision?  A user’s guide to Western railroading in 2002,” Trains, February 
2002; “Ground Solution:  UP, CSX find a way to make UPS more competitive while taking business away 
from BNSF,” Traffic World, August 18, 2003. 
18 Frank Malone, “KCS in control,” Railway Age, May 1, 2004; “Railroad agrees to invest in partnership,” 
Virginian-Pilot  (Norfolk, VA), December 3, 2005; Daniel Machalabe, “America’s Railroads Back on 
Track:  New era for rail building,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2008. 
19 “Pan Am Railways and Norfolk Southern Create the Patriot Corridor to Improve Rail Service and 
Expand Capacity in New York and New England,” Science Letter, May 27, 2008; Eric Anderson, “City’s 
industry on right track:  Mechanicville railyards will see plenty of activity once again with planned $40M 
logistics center,” The Times Union (Albany, NY), July 9, 2008.  The proposal is STB Finance Docket No. 
35147 1. 
20 See, e.g., Daniel Machalaba, “America working on railroads – America’s Railroads Back on Track – 
New era for rail building,” Mobile Register (Mobile, AL), February 17, 2008, and Anderson, “City’s 
  7motor carriers compete with rail, this is likely the end of the discussion regarding 
competition.  However, for those commodities dependent on rail, the number of carriers 
offering service is typically very small, and it seems possible that a joint venture that 
significantly disadvantaged a competitor could be found exclusionary, and thus a 
violation of regulations or antitrust laws.  (This could especially be the case if the 
competitor were denied access absolutely.)  On the one hand, it is difficult to imagine the 
joint venture partner making the investment if it did not expect favorable access terms to 
the new infrastructure capacity as a result; on the other, it is not difficult to imagine – 
especially given the experience in telecoms and elsewhere – a competitor that was not 
invited to participate complaining of discrimination and demanding access. 
  In the fourth category, there has been over the years a great deal of joint activity – 
whether or not formally termed “alliances” – involving railroads that are direct 
competitors to one another, especially if one includes in this category the terminal 
railroads created by the railroads serving cities such as Chicago, St. Louis, and Kansas 
City.  More recently, competitors UP and BNSF are part of broader public-private 
partnerships to expand rail capacity in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach and the 
Chicago metropolitan area.
21  They are also partners in expanding capacity on a jointly 
owned line serving the coal fields of the Southern Powder River Basin in Wyoming.
22  
Boland (2001) reports other examples: 
•  CN and CP share track to increase traffic on light density lines (eastern Canada) 
and to increase capacity on high density lines (Fraser Canyon); 
•  BNSF and UP have implemented joint dispatching over shared track assets in the 
Gulf Coast area of Texas; and 
•  NS and CSX have mutual traffic solicitation rights in shared asset areas of the 
former Conrail system. 
Non-cartel agreements among direct competitors are treated under a “rule of reason” 
standard in U.S. antitrust law, wherein any harm to competition is measured against 
economic benefits from the agreement, and harm that cannot be removed without losing 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry on right track,” ibid.  Anderson reports that the Patriot Corridor project “will help [NS] compete 
directly with CSX Transportation.” 
21 “Five go in search of capacity,” Railway Gazette International, August 1, 2004. 
22 Union Pacific Railroad, “UP, BNSF Announce Southern Powder River Basin Joint Line $100 Million 
Capacity Expansion Plan,” press release, May 8, 2006. 
  8the benefits is accepted if it is outweighed by the benefits.
23  The same is true in most 
competition regimes around the world.
24  Thus railway companies engaging in horizontal 
alliances such as these must take care that any ancillary agreements that may reduce 
competition are no more restrictive than absolutely necessary to render the benefits of the 
alliance achievable.  However, it is fair to say that, as with the standard-setting 
organizations and trade associations discussed earlier, this sort of cooperation among 
competitors takes place widely and generally without interference from antitrust or 
regulatory authorities. 
3.  Europe:  Aspirations of Vertical Separation 
European Commission policy makers have been seeking to open up the European 
freight rail business to above-the-rail competition since at least 1991.  In that year the 
Commission issued Directive 91/440, which required incumbent national railways to 
provide access to their infrastructure for international intermodal (i.e., container) freight 
carriers under non-discriminatory prices and terms of service.  This was followed in 1995 
and then 2001 by Directive 95/18 (as amended, Directive 2001/13) ordering the further 
opening of access to all international freight operators over a number of years, and then 
by Directive 2001/14 ordering the opening of access to domestic as well as international 
freight carriers by 2007 (Stehmann and Zellhofer, 2004; Nash, 2006).  While none of 
these directives required complete vertical separation of train operations from 
infrastructure (i.e., “ownership” separation), the head of DG-Comp stated at the time that 
he considered such separation necessary if competition was to be effective.
25  The main 
policy objective has been to create smoothly operating cross-border train operators to 
ease road congestion and reduce air pollution by competing away some of the business of 
the motor carriers. 
The state of actual competition that has followed these directives is something of 
a mixed bag.  On the one hand, there has been some entry by new, non-integrated freight 
train operating companies, in particular in Poland, Romania, and the U.K.
26  Even with 
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration 
among Competitors, Washington, DC:  2000. 
24 See, e.g., Whish (2008). 
25 See, e.g., Monti (2002). 
26 On Poland and Romania (and other Central and Eastern European countries), see Pittman, et al. (2007).  
On England, see, e.g., Glaister (2006) and Posner (2006 and 2008). 
  9small numbers of entrants, concerns have been expressed that entry will drive prices 
down to near marginal costs; that entrants (especially shippers integrating into 
transporting their own products) will take the high margin, “block train” traffic only; and, 
as a result, the system may deteriorate in the long run; and especially that service to 
shippers of smaller “wagonload” volumes will be lost to motor carriers.
27  This scenario 
calls attention to the importance of fixed costs of infrastructure in the rail sector and 
related issues regarding access pricing and price discrimination to which we will turn 
presently. 
On the other hand, concerns have also been expressed that the German incumbent 
freight carrier, DB Schenker – still connected organizationally with the infrastructure 
owner and still state owned – may be in the process of precluding the development of 
above-the-rail freight competition in western Europe, as it (1) has successively purchased 
NS Cargo (Netherlands), DSB Gods (Denmark), EWS (UK), Transfesa (Spain), and SFM 
(Italy), (2) owns 45 % of BLS Cargo AG (Switzerland), (3) was rumored to have sought 
to purchase Green Cargo (Sweden), and (4) is reported now to be considering the 
acquisition of CTL Logistics (Poland) and Romtrans (Romania).
28 
Furthermore, if DB Schenker were to acquire a dominant position in a 
hypothetical market called “above-the-rail freight haulage in western Europe”, such 
dominance would potentially be strengthened by the company’s past acquisitions of 
international logistics companies Stinnes AG and BAX Global.  These acquisitions 
increased the company’s offerings not only in European rail freight haulage but also in 
European motor freight haulage and global sea and air freight.
29  DB Schenker would no 
doubt argue that this widening and deepening of the services it provides are part of the 
reason for its growth and success in the provision of freight transport, but vertical 
acquisitions such as these may in principle have the potential – always depending on the 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Posner (2006 and 2008). 
28 “Europe’s private freight operators under siege,” Railway Gazette International, 1 July 2007; “Deutsche 
Bahn could buy Romtrans,” The Railway Insider (Bucharest), 21 August 2008; “Deutsche Bahn Is 
Interested in Acquiring CTL Logistics,” RZD Partner, September 4, 2008; and “Railion,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Railion”.  The dominance of DB Schenker within Germany is discussed by, 
e.g., Locher (2006). 
29 See, for example, Paul Needham, “Logistics is now for railroads,” JoC Week, July 15-12, 2002; Paul 
Page, “BAX Hitches Rail Ride,” Traffic World, November 14, 2005; and “BAX’s Global Reach,” Air 
Cargo World, December 2005. 
  10facts of the case involved – to raise concerns among competition law enforcers regarding 
the possible entrenchment of a dominant position in the primary market of concern.  (A 
recent round table of the OECD’s Joint Transport Research Centre addressed this very 
topic.)
30 
A separate and potentially contradictory problem is that many European countries 
have not imposed full ownership separation on their incumbent, vertically integrated 
railway enterprises, raising the possibility of continued national level freight monopolists 
likely surrendering access to international carriers only grudgingly, as opposed to a single 
dominant Europe-wide carrier. 
In fact some argue that these two problems are not contradictory but rather 
connected.  Matthias Raith, former general manager of one independent train operating 
company, Rail4Chem (Germany), claimed that the incumbent European freight carriers 
were forming alliances and agreements in order to foreclose new entry, likening them to 
“elderly boxers embracing one another in the ring because they both know they are at the 
end of their careers.”  Mr. Raith proposed an alliance of small European freight train 
operating companies that would be designed to promote their ability to compete with 
entrenched incumbents, and Rail4Chem went on to form such an alliance with COMSA 
(Spain), fer Polska (Poland), LTE (Austria and Slovak Republic), NordCargo (Italy), 
viamont (Czech Republic), and most recently VFLI (France).
31 
Since the railways of western Europe are predominantly passenger rather than 
freight dominated, and since the countries are small relative to the larger countries in the 
Americas, the econometric results cited earlier for the U.S. system can be applied to 
Europe only very carefully.  Nevertheless the policy goal of greatly increased cross-
border train operations – including but not limited to freight – suggests that the results for 
the U.S. concerning economies of system size (exhausted at relatively low levels) and 
density (less easily exhausted) may be relevant in the future; they would seem to suggest 
                                                 
30 Integration and Competition between Transport and Logistics Businesses, Paris, 5-6 February 2009, 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/roundtables.html.  See especially the papers by Van de 
Voorde and Vanelslander (2009) and Frémont (2009). 
31 “Euro View:  Can rail see green signal?”  Journal of Commerce, April 4, 2003; Paul Needham, “Still 
struggling to rectify that slow train to Europe:  Lack of a rail regulator in seven EU states is a major 
drawback to ensuring discrimination-free access,” Lloyd’s List, December 13, 2004; “European alliance 
formed,”  International Railway Journal, March 2005; Jan Scherp, “Railway (De-)Regulation in EU 
Member States and the Future of European Rail,” CESIFO DICE Report, April 2005. 
  11the feasibility of regional train companies, either vertically integrated or not, that would 
have a tendency to possess market power within their regions but the ability to compete 
at points of intersection and overlap with other, similar companies.
32  (Such “points of 
intersection” need not be precise, since many commodities are hauled by motor carrier to 
a railhead in any case.  See, e.g., Pittman [1990].)  In general, the literature on vertical 
economies (i.e., economies of scope between train and infrastructure operations) is less 
consistent, but mild economies are at least suggested.
33 
The contradictory problems would seem to raise contradictory implications for the 
competitive analysis of further mergers and/or alliances.  If the problem is the remaining 
power of an incumbent national carrier like CFR Marfǎ in Romania, for example, then a 
purchase by DB Schenker of an independent Romanian train operating company such as 
Romtrans or of a potential entrant into Romania like CTL would appear to be 
procompetitive, a way to continue to wrest the market from the incumbent dominant 
carrier.  If, on the other hand – which seems more likely in the long term – the problem is 
likely future dominance by DB Schenker or another company in a Europe-wide above-
the-rail freight market, then a strengthening of a company like CFR Marfǎ through 
mergers and/or alliances – or, correspondingly, the proposed merger of the incumbent 
Czech and Slovak freight carriers and the proposed merger of the incumbent Austrian and 
Hungarian freight carriers – look like steps to maintain some competitive options.
34  And 
in either case the model pursued by Rail4Chem (now a part of Veolia Cargo) through the 
European Bulls – the formation of an alliance among smaller freight carriers – is only to 
be encouraged from a competitive standpoint. 
Behind all these considerations is the issue of recovering network costs in a model 
of vertical separation:  the setting of access prices will be crucial. 
Finally, in both passenger and freight rail in Europe, one factor dominating much 
of the conversation is the small share of rail vis-à-vis other modes, mostly motor carriers 
                                                 
32 Savignat and Nash (1999) make a similar suggestion.  If these regional “monopolists” remain vertically 
integrated, this is precisely what I have called above the “Latin American model”. 
33 Bitzan (2000); Ivaldi and McCullough (2001 and 2008); Growitsch and Wetzel (2006); Wills-Johnson 
(2007).  A non-econometric discussion is in Pittman (2005). 
34 “CTL Logistics want to enter the Romanian market,” The Railway Insider (Bucharest), 14 December 
2007; “Czech Republic/Slovakia:  Ready to merge rail freight companies,” RZD Partner, 26 August 2008; 
“EU inquiry deadline for Rail Cargo Austria buy of MAV Cargo Sept 29,” Forbes, 28 August 2008, citing 
Thomson Financial News. 
  12for freight but including both air carriers and passenger autos for passenger.  (This is 
more the case in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe, however.)  The formation of an 
alliance among Western European incumbent passenger rail providers, dubbed Railteam, 
is designed specifically to attract business away from air carriers – through, for example, 
unified booking, discount fares, and reduced border delays.
35  (In the framework 
introduced earlier in the paper, this is an example of an End-to-End alliance.)  If a 
competition enforcer or regulator defined the product market narrowly as “passenger 
train service”, such an alliance might be seen as an anticompetitive agreement by the 
national incumbents not to invade each other’s territories.  To the degree that the more 
appropriate product market definition includes air transport, the small share of rail 
carriers renders such concerns much less pressing. 
Similarly, for goods that may be competitively hauled by motor carrier, the share 
of rail within Europe is typically quite low, and a potentially anticompetitive agreement 
among incumbent rail freight carriers would seem to pose little risk of harming shippers.  
However, for commodities that are (economically) “rail captive”, whether agreements 
and alliances among national incumbents are innocuous is not as clear.  For these 
commodities the more appropriate product market definition is typically “freight train 
service”, and the high market shares of incumbents, combined with barriers to entry (i.e., 
to network access), make such agreements and alliances more likely to raise competitive 
concerns.  As noted above, the same is true for agreements and alliances (and mergers) of 
incumbent freight rail carriers with companies in vertically related services such as 
logistics and ocean shipping. 
 
4.  Access Prices 
As noted above, when competition “above the rail” is created, one crucial issue 
becomes the financing of maintenance and improvement to the infrastructure.  In this 
regard rail is no different from any other network industry, except that the share of fixed 
network costs in total delivered costs is probably higher for rail than for any other sector 
besides water.  As with other network industries – telecoms is probably the most studied 
                                                 
35 Aoife White, “European high-speed rail tickets to compete with short-haul airline routes,” Associated 
Press Worldstream, July 2, 2007; “A high-speed revolution:  Europe’s railways,” The Economist, July 7, 
2007. 
  13in this regard – there are real tradeoffs that must be made between encouraging 
competition and supporting investment. 
The principal problem is the traditional one of seeking the most efficient method 
for the recovery of fixed costs.
36  An access charge set at the level of marginal 
infrastructure cost achieves the most efficient level of usage in the short term, but then 
the fixed costs must be recovered in some other way, for example through taxation, with 
the accompanying losses measured by the shadow price of public moneys (especially 
high in developing countries).  An access charge set at the level of full infrastructure cost 
recovery results in the inefficient turning away of potential users that could pay the 
marginal cost of their usage but not the “fully allocated” cost.  An access charge seeking 
a second best middle ground through Ramsey prices or two-part tariffs is vulnerable to 
being labeled “discriminatory” – as of course it is, by definition – and thus challenged by 
a competition enforcement authority. 
EU Directive 2001/14 essentially calls for marginal cost access pricing for rail – 
charges must be based on “costs directly incurred as a result of operating the train 
service” – with a broad interpretation of marginal cost that includes reservation and 
scarcity charges, environmental costs, and volume-related savings (Nash, 2005 and 
2006).  However, mark-ups above marginal cost are permitted where necessary for 
financial reasons, and where such mark-ups are non-discriminatory.  Nash believes that 
the latter requirement probably rules out two-part tariffs – consistent with the reaction of 
the Bundeskartellamt to such a proposal by DB – but may possibly permit Ramsey 
pricing.
37 
Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the issue of access prices turns out to be a relative 
weakness of the “above-the-rail competition” model.  Nash (2005) and Matthews, et al. 
(2008) note the inability of an infrastructure operator to have complete knowledge of the 
cargo or cargos being hauled by all trains, while BTRE (2003) reports that in practice 
attempts by infrastructure operators to discriminate in access charging among a small 
number of train operating companies has led to rent dissipation through bargaining, 
                                                 
36 I have discussed this in the context of railways in Pittman (2004b). 
37 Matthews, et al. (2008) provides a thorough discussion of the state of the debate and analysis in the 
European Union.  The DB access pricing episode is discussed in Dagmar Haase, “New Train Path Pricing 
System at Deutsche Bahn,” DB Netz, n.d.  See also Pittman (2004b). 
  14regulatory challenges, and litigation.  Based on the more successful North American 
experience setting shipping charges rather than access charges, it appears that it is easier 
for a vertically integrated railways company to discriminate among large numbers of 
shippers than for a vertically separated rail infrastructure company to discriminate among 
a smaller number of train operating companies.
38 
What is the relevance of this issue for the question of mergers and alliances 
among railways companies?  Many such agreements – in any of the policy contexts 
discussed here – will involve voluntary arrangements for the use of one company’s track 
infrastructure by another company’s trains.  One would normally presume that the two 
companies involved in such an agreement would negotiate an efficient pricing regime.  A 
problem in the experience with the American model – in Mexico in particular – has been 
a fear by the companies that any terms that they agree on for private, voluntary track 
sharing arrangements will be adopted by the regulator and the courts and imposed for 
mandated track sharing arrangements.  This has been one reported reason for the paucity 
of such voluntary agreements.  Another problem has been observed in Canada, where the 
two principal railways have statutory access to some of each other’s “captive shippers”, 
and both railways seem satisfied to pursue a “live and let live” policy rather than starting 
a battle for each other’s captive shippers (Ouellet, 2000). 
Clearly the ability of the government to set the right access prices is a crucial 
component of any regime of mandatory access, whether under the American model 
(when and if trackage rights are imposed in a merger settlement, for example, or to 
protect competition in other situations) or under either variant of the above-the-rail 
model.  As pointed out by both Matthews, et al. (2008) and Thompson (2008), the fact 
that there is little agreement as to what the right access prices are even conceptually, 
much less empirically, makes this issue especially difficult. 
A further problem in Europe – particularly in the context of the policy of 
encouraging cross-border freight and passenger train operations – has been the lack of 
harmonization of national access pricing regimes.  The EU Directive discussed above 
provides principles for access price setting but does not impose uniformity, and in 
practice the regimes differ a great deal by country (Nash, 2005; Thompson, 2008).  This 
                                                 
38 See also Bouf (2002). 
  15is not the only factor discouraging cross-border operations; differences in other terms of 
access are a factor, and anticompetitive behavior has been charged as well.
39  B u t  
certainly the multiplicity of access pricing regimes has played a part.  This is a bit ironic 
since most of the western European rail systems are passenger- rather than freight-
dominated, so that some would argue that freight operations should have to contribute 
little to fixed charges in any case. 
Thompson (2008) proposes collaboration among country-level infrastructure 
managers in Europe “to see if the same simple [access] regimes could be implemented for 
freight on the major freight corridors EU-wide,” in order to “make international freight 
flows much easier for competing operators to plan and manage.”  This sort of End-to-End 
cooperation intended to smooth and advance joint rail freight hauls would seem likely to 
be viewed as benign by competition law enforcers. 
5.  Lessons for Other Network Industries? 
What lessons may we derive from the experience in railways for competition 
issues regarding mergers and alliances in other network industries? 
I would argue first that the potential for competition among vertically integrated 
providers has been undervalued in policy debates, both as a restructuring model on its 
own and as a factor in understanding mergers and alliances.  This option has taken a poor 
second place to vertical separation in the worldwide debate among economists regarding 
restructuring of the infrastructure sectors broadly – or a poor third to vertical separation 
and third party access.  However, this option has many virtues – not least the (self-
evident) one of maintaining whatever economies of vertical integration are available 
(Pittman, 2007a).  The experience of Latin American railways restructuring and the 
importance of “source competition” for rail shippers in the U.S. and Canada have made it 
quite clear that there are circumstances in which competition may be created without 
having to break up going concerns. 
It seems conceivable that restructuring along these lines has at least some 
potential in both the electricity and water sectors.  (In Australia there is already some 
discussion of competition for traditional water purification plants from future 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Italian Competition Authority, Case 1681, “Rail Traction Company/Rete Ferroviaria italiana-
Ferrovie dello stato,” 18 January 2007, Provvedimento no. 17327, Avvio istruttoria, Bollettino no. 33/2007. 
  16desalinization plants, and there seems no obvious reason why the latter could not be 
owned and operated jointly with distribution pipes.)  Correspondingly, it is important for 
competition authorities and regulators to be alert to the possibility that mergers or 
alliances between providers in adjacent territories – vertically integrated or not – may 
harm actual or potential competition at points of intersection.  If one railway or long-
distance electricity transmission line or gas pipeline or water pipe serves Brussels, or 
comes close to Brussels, from the southwest, and another serves it or comes close from 
the southeast or northeast, the two may be able to compete with each other to provide the 
service to Brussels, and a merger or alliance that appears to be of the relatively innocuous 
end-to-end variety could eliminate the only competition available. 
A second lesson may be that firms are sophisticated players in the regulatory and 
competition law processes, and they may behave strategically – in particular, they may 
choose not to behave competitively to earn short term profits if they fear that the result 
will be a less profitable future.  This has apparently been the case both in Canada – where 
shippers captive to CN or CP have a statutory right to competitive service from the other 
under some circumstances, but where neither of these railroad companies has often 
provided the cooperation necessary – and in Mexico – where the three vertically 
integrated incumbents have eschewed voluntary track-sharing agreements, apparently out 
of a fear that the terms of such agreements would be used by regulators under less 
voluntary conditions.  (Some would argue that this problem has characterized the US 
local telecommunications sector under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as well, as 
reflected in the background facts in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent Twombly
40 
decision.)  This may be an important consideration in any infrastructure sector when 
considering competitive or regulatory remedies that rely for their competitive outcomes 
on market entry by other large firms – especially given the increasing concentration of 
the set of worldwide players in each sector (Benitez and Estache, 2005). 
Finally, a more optimistic lesson:  it is not always true, but certainly it is often true 
that customers in network industries have many options that may protect them from 
monopolistic behavior by otherwise “monopolistic” service providers.  Regarding rail 
freight, the most obvious protection is provided by other transport modes; motor carriers 
                                                 
40 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
  17can for many commodities – especially non-bulk commodities – provide more 
competition than rail carriers can handle, and water carriers can in many cases provide 
similar competition for shippers of bulk commodities.  Shippers in “American model” 
countries may be protected by source competition even if they lack parallel competition, 
while shippers in “above-the-rails competition” countries may begin operating their own 
trains if they think they are paying too much to their incumbent supplier.  Of course these 
factors are sector specific, but arguably the technological convergence between 
telecommunications and cable television providers moves in the direction of providing a 
similar example.
41 
This goes to the heart of competition issues in network industries, and it may be a 
good point with which to close.  Network industries are almost by definition industries 
with significant fixed costs that must be somehow recovered if the network is to be built 
in the first place and then maintained and improved.  This means that we should be 
satisfied with a market structure far short of perfect competition, with the accompanying 
prices competed down close to marginal costs; a not unrelated point is that efficient usage 
of the network may involve some kind of price discrimination, charged either by the 
network operator as an access price or by an integrated service provider.  Marginal cost 
pricing in a network industry is a recipe for long term disaster – or, as Posner (2006) 
summarizes, “Open Access advocates should be very careful what they ask for because 
they just might get it.”
                                                 
41 For one discussion, see U.S. Department of Justice (2007). 
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